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According to the no miracles argument, scientific realism provides the only 
satisfactory explanation of the predictive success of science. It is argued in the 
present article that a different explanatory strategy, based on the posit of strong 
limitations to the underdetermination of scientific theory building by the available 
empirical data, offers a more convincing understanding of scientific success.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction. Having been long overshadowed by other notions of underdetermination, 
the question of the underdetermination of scientific theory building by the available empirical 
data has lately attracted increasing attention. [Stanford 2001, 2006] makes the point that it is 
this form of underdetermination, referred to under the name ‘transient underdetermination’, 
that offers the strongest argument against scientific realism. In a more specific scientific 
context, [Dawid 2006, 2013] argues that indications for strong limitations to the same kind of 
underdetermination – called scientific underdetermination in that context – are responsible 
for the trust physicists can develop in their theory despite a lack of empirical confirmation.  
The present paper will emphasise the importance of scientific underdetermination for 
a debate that has mostly been framed in quite different terms so far. Limitations to scientific 
underdetermination can provide a viable explanation of the predictive success of science and 
may be abductively inferred on that ground. The resulting argument resembles the classical 
no miracles argument (NMA) [Putnam 1975], which abductively infers scientific realism 
from the predictive success of science and is often considered the best available argument in 
favour of scientific realism. It shall be demonstrated in this paper that the posit of limitations 
to scientific underdetermination provides a substantially more satisfactory framework for 
explaining the predictive success of science than full fledged scientific realism.  
After a short analysis of some reasons for the failure of classical NMA in Section 2, 
Sections 3 and 4 discuss the significance of the question of scientific underdetermination in 
the given context. Section 5 presents the general layout of an argument that works 
analogously to NMA but is based on underdetermination.  
 
2. Why classical NMA is bound to fail. NMA is a three step argument. First it is asserted 
that the frequent predictive success of science looks like a miracle as long as one does not 
assume scientific realism. Then it is argued that scientific realism, i.e. the position that the 
statements of well-established scientific theories are largely approximately true in a literal 
sense, can in fact provide a satisfactory explanation of the predictive success of science. 
Finally, inference to the best explanation leads to the conclusion that scientific realism is 
probably true. Some philosophers (see e.g. [Musgrave 1985]) have specified step one by 
emphasising that only successful predictions of genuinely novel phenomena require a realist 
explanation, while the frequent occurrence of correct scientific predictions which constitute 
mere extrapolations of a pattern of observations are explicable based on the validity of the 
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principle of induction without any further assumptions. This more specific understanding of 
NMA shall be adopted in the following. 
While the viability of NMA has been questioned in a number of ways, I want to focus 
on one fundamental problem that may be phrased in terms of a dilemma with respect to the 
specific interpretation of the notion of “predictive success of science”. The latter notion can 
be understood in two distinct ways. One interpretation takes predictive success of science as 
referring to the success of individual scientific theories: the philosopher asks why specific 
scientific theories make successful predictions. In line with [Dawid and Hartmann 2017] I 
will call this understanding the individual theory based notion of predictive success. The 
version of NMA based on it shall be called individual theory based NMA. The alternative is 
to understand the predictive success of science as referring to the scientific process. In this 
understanding, the phenomenon to be explained by NMA is not the predictive success of 
individual theories but rather the fact that the scientific process frequently leads to the 
emergence of theories which make successful predictions. The core of the question is thus 
shifted to an epistemic level: why are scientists capable of finding predictively successful 
theories so often? This second notion of predictive success shall be called the frequency 
based notion. The version of NMA based on it shall be called frequency based NMA. Both 
the individual theory based and the frequency based understanding of NMA can be found in 
the literature
2
 and quite frequently the distinction is not clearly spelled out. Once the 
distinction between the two understandings of scientific success has been acknowledged, 
however, it is quite straightforward to show that neither can fully support NMA: while the 
individual theory-based notion fails to establish step one of the argument laid out in the first 
paragraph of this section, the epistemic notion does not support step two. 
Looking at the individual theory based notion of scientific success, one first notes 
that it is focused on the theory itself rather than on the historical contingencies of the research 
process, which makes it insensitive to the distinction between accommodation and novel 
confirmation. Accommodation denotes the theory’s consistency with empirical data that has 
influenced its creation, while novel confirmation denotes the successful prediction of data 
that has not influenced the theory’s creation. If one focusses on the individual theory and its 
characteristics rather than on the scientific process, a theory’s scientific success is reduced to 
the fact that the theory saves the phenomena. Novel confirmation on that reading of scientific 
success does not seem to have higher confirmation value than accommodation. As pointed 
out in [van Fraassen 1980], however, the explanation of predictive success turns into a fairly 
unspectacular enterprise on that basis. A theory’s success can be understood to be the 
immediate consequence of two primitive facts: the theory’s mathematical structure (plus its 
physical interpretation) on the one hand and the empirical data on the other. A theory’s 
predictive success then is sufficiently explained by pointing out that, qua its mathematical 
structure and the way it is fit to the data already available, the theory is empirically adequate 
with respect to some data set collected after its creation. The scientific realist seems to be at 
loss to offer a plausible reason why any other explanation of scientific success should be 
required.  
The realist might try to counter this line of reasoning by insisting that a purely 
analytical argument cannot explain two contingent elements in the observation of a specific 
theory’s predictive success: (i) the observation that this specific theory rather than any other 
has been successful; and (ii) the observation that we have a predictively highly successful 
theory on the given subject at all.  
The first point has been successfully defeated by Bas van Fraassen’s Darwinian 
argument. The fact that we end up with a successful theory rather than one of the not so 
successful ones is simply a matter of theory selection based on success. The second point, 
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referring to the observation that a predictively successful theory has been found at all, fails 
because the observation just cannot be shown to be in need of an explanation within the 
framework of individual theory based NMA. Though it is correct that an individual theory 
that is randomly chosen from a set of theories that have not been selected according to 
predictive success is unlikely to be predictively highly successful, this statement on its own 
does not determine the probability that a theory that is predictively successful has been 
developed. The additional pieces of information required for stating that probability would be 
the number of possible scientific theories and the number of theories scientists have 
developed. The situation may be compared to a lottery where, despite the fact that winning is 
extremely improbable for each individual player, it may still be likely that someone will do 
so for the simple reason that many people participate. Analogously, a sufficiently large 
number of theories that have been developed could make it likely that at least one of those is 
predictively highly successful on purely numerical grounds. In this light, since individual 
theory based NMA addresses neither the number of possible scientific theories nor the 
number of theories that have been developed, it fails to specify a scenario within which the 
existence of a predictively successful theory can be in need of explanation.  
This problem is directly related to the charge, first put forward in [Howson 2000], that 
NMA commits the base rate fallacy. According to Howson, the supporter of individual 
theory based NMA fallaciously believes that if a false theory is unlikely and an 
approximately true theory is likely to be predictively successful, this implies that a 
predictively successful theory under scrutiny is probably approximately true. As Howson 
points out, hat inference is not justified as long as the base rate, that is the prior probability 
that the theory is approximately true, has not been taken into account. As argued in [Menke 
2014, Henderson 2017 and Dawid and Hartmann 2017], Howson’s reasoning applies 
specifically to individual theory based NMA, which provides no basis for extracting the base 
rate. In line with the previous analysis, one could characterize the situation the following 
way: as long as the base rate has not been specified, it has not been demonstrated that a 
theory’s predictive success poses a problem that requires an explanation at all.  
So far, we have not even succeeded in establishing the first of the three steps required 
for a successful abductive inference from scientific success to scientific realism: we have not 
even found a problem scientific realism could try to solve. The frequency-based notion of 
predictive scientific success does master this first step. The presented arguments that 
worked against individual theory-based NMA fail against frequency based NMA. The 
phenomenon of the frequent occurrence of successful predictions of new phenomena in 
science is a contingent observation about the research process that cannot be explained 
analytically by comparing data with the theory’s predictions. Nor does the setup of the 
problem suffer from the base-rate fallacy. As demonstrated in [Dawid and Hartmann 2017] 
extracting a frequency of predictive success amounts to specifying the base-rate in the 
context of Howson’s analysis and therefore does specify what is in need of explanation. 
While I have no basis for being surprised about the existence of an individual successful 
theory as long as I know nothing about number of theories that were developed but failed, a 
significant success frequency among scientific theories may well be surprising and may 
require an explanation. Darwinian reasoning fails in the frequency-based case as well. Since 
we now look at the historical record rather than just at an individual theory and its 
characteristics, the problem of scientific success now can be phrased in terms of novel 
confirmation: why do scientists so often choose the ‘right’ theories with respect to empirical 
data that has not influenced the process of theory selection? A Darwinian answer that 
consists in pointing to the process of theory selection in this case just begs the question.   
The antirealist can still deny the need for explanation by denying any significant 
tendency towards successful predictions of novel phenomena in natural science (see e.g. 
[Fine 1986]). This claim looks fairly unconvincing, however. Even though it seems difficult 
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to come up with any kind of theory counting algorithm that would allow for a quantitative 
assessment of the ratio of scientific theories in a field that give successful predictions, it is 
obvious that the exact sciences have a dramatically higher rate of novel predictive success 
than other kinds of scientific analysis (like humanities) or other kinds of intellectual activity 
(like science fiction). This difference does seem to deserve some kind of explanation.  
Epistemic NMA therefore is far more successful than its analytic cousin in 
establishing that it addresses a serious problem that afflicts the understanding of science. It 
achieves this success by increasing the explanatory task for scientific realism from explaining 
an individual theory’s predictive success to explaining a tendency of novel predictive success 
within a research field.  
Unfortunately, it thereby raises the bar to a height scientific realism is incapable of 
jumping. As [Laudan 1981] and [Fine 1986] were among the first to point out, even if the 
realist were right in asserting that a theory’s approximate truth can be inferred from its past 
predictive success, the available empirical evidence would offer no reason for assuming that 
the theory’s approximate truth extends to those theoretical aspects that are responsible for the 
prediction of so far untested phenomena. The problem is based on the fact that even the 
staunchest scientific realist cannot claim that successful scientific theories are absolutely true. 
In light of the history of science, even very successful theories are expected to fail 
empirically someday. That failure will then lead to the development of new theories that, in 
the realist’s understanding, will be even closer to absolute truth. In order to account for this 
view, scientific realists claim merely the approximate truth rather than the absolute truth of 
successful theories. The concept of approximate truth is deployed specifically in order to 
allow for the failure of an approximately true theory’s future predictions. It seems very 
difficult to defend the idea that the deployment of the very same concept can also explain the 
theory’s predictive success. The scientific realist thus seems in no better position than the 
antirealist to explain the scientist’s capability of generating successful scientific predictions 
of novel phenomena.  
 
3. The Case for Scientific Underdetermination. The analysis up to this point suggests that 
NMA fails because it cannot escape a lethal dilemma: if it merely addresses the predictive 
success of individual scientific theories, there is nothing “miraculous” to be explained; if it 
addresses a tendency of predictive success in a research field, an interesting problem does 
arise, but scientific realism is incapable of offering a solution. The present paper aims at 
providing an alternative to scientific realism that is capable of addressing the second, 
frequency-based problem in a satisfactory way. 
We have already encountered the question that shall be crucial for achieving the 
envisioned goal. The reason why individual theory based NMA does not get off the ground 
lies in its silence regarding the question of how many possible scientific theories could fit the 
available empirical data. It shall be argued in the following that the implicit assumption that 
the number of possible alternative theories is limited (henceforth to be called the assumption 
of limitations to scientific underdetermination) is crucial for the intuitive appeal of NMA as 
well as for advanced attempts to rescue NMA from the arguments presented in the previous 
section. Eventually it will turn out that the posit of limitations to scientific 
underdetermination can provide an explanation of the predictive success of the scientific 
process independently from the posit of scientific realism.   
 
4. Intuition-Based Scientific Realism and its Successors. We start the analysis by raising a 
question that seems to have no immediate connection to scientific underdetermination. Given 
the fairly straightforward character of the argument presented at the end of Section 2, why 
does NMA nevertheless look intuitively very plausible? 
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In order to get closer to an answer to this question, let us imagine, for the moment, a 
simpler world than the one we live in. In that world, all physical phenomena can be described 
by applying to unobservable objects the classical physical laws which guide observable 
processes. A scientific realist in this ‘classical-world’ may endorse the rigid ‘classicality’-
condition that all real objects behave exactly like observable objects. The theorist who wants 
to avoid false theories in this world can only posit objects of smaller size and must try to 
reproduce any new microphysical data on that basis. Scientific realism based on the rigid 
classicality-condition thus implies very severe limitations to scientific theory building by 
excluding all theoretical schemes that fit the available empirical data but do not have a rigidly 
classical interpretation. A rigid classicality realist can explain predictive success by pointing 
to the very limited options of theory building under rigid classicality realism. It may still 
happen that new phenomenology opens up due to unconceived smaller objects (the present 
theory thus may not be absolutely true), but no new theoretical principles will be added and 
the claim of approximate truth can be upheld. An additional assumption on the scarcity of 
new particles then can provide a basis for explaining predictive success in the given scenario. 
NMA works in this scenario because rigid classicality realism enforces strong limitations to 
the underdetermination of theory building by the available data. 
For a long time, scientific theory building aimed at defending a watered down version 
of classical-world, retaining characteristics of observable objects in the conceptions of 
unobservable objects whenever possible.
3
 Successes which were achieved along these lines
4
 
could then be realistically explained – more or less convincingly - by following the strategy 
laid out in the classical-world example. Twentieth century physics, however, made life 
considerably more difficult for the scientific realist. Modern physical theories like special and 
general relativity, quantum mechanics or gauge field theory jettison so many elements of the 
intuitive human notions of physical objects, space and time that those elements which have 
survived so far may be expected to be sacrificed to some future theoretical change. Classical 
intuitions about the behaviour of physical objects thus don’t play a significant role for the 
construction and interpretation of today’s fundamental physical theories. As a consequence, 
scientific realism has left behind its intuitive roots. Modern NMA is formulated without any 
direct reference to intuitive notions of physical objects
5
 and focuses on the abstract concept of 
the relation between a statement’s empirical success and its truth. The negative implications 
of this step, however, have already been pointed out: if fully retreating to the described core 
definition, scientific realism forsakes its normative authority in scientific theory building and 
thus loses its ability to enforce restrictions to the underdetermination of scientific theory 
building. Lacking this instrument for providing an epistemological explanation of successful 
theory choice, it finds itself in the unfortunate situation sketched in section 2.  
In order to save NMA, the realist therefore must look for concepts other than 
ontological naivety which can work as guidelines towards true theories by enforcing 
limitations to scientific underdetermination. The most popular candidates for this role (see e.g. 
[Boyd 1984]) are criteria like simplicity, lack of ad-hoc-ness, universality or predictive 
power
6
, which seem to play a significant role in the construction and selection of scientific 
theories. They may be deployed by the realist in the following way. One finds (i) that 
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successful scientific theories tend to fulfil the abovementioned criteria and (ii) that theories 
built in accordance with these criteria tend to be successful. Both observations can best be 
explained by assuming that the true description of reality fulfils the stated criteria or criteria 
closely related to them. Searching for theories which fulfil the stated criteria then enhances 
the chances of finding theories which are close to truth.  
A careful look at the structure of the above argument reveals, however, that its success 
does not depend on the core posit of scientific realism. Scientific predictiveness is explained 
by introducing general scientific criteria like universality which guide the scientific process. 
and thereby enforce limitations to the underdetermination of theory building. The argument 
relies solely on the assumption that our present theories in some way reflect the universality 
or similar properties of the true theory. It remains valid whether or not the substantial claims 
of current scientific theories are approximately true.  
In addition, the assumption that the application of criteria like universality suffices for 
guiding the scientist towards predictively successful theories is by no means self-evident. 
Universality would not be a good indicator of a theory’s predictive success if the limitations 
to the underdetermination of theory building which applied with regard to scientific theories 
that are consistent with the data and at least as universal as the one under scrutiny were not 
sufficiently strong. Assumptions of strong limitations to scientific underdetermination thus 
constitute the actual core posits of any attempt to explain scientific success based on the 
scientists’ adoption of some set of preconceptions which guide theory selection. The scientific 
realist’s reference to additional criteria for theory selection thus is based on a misjudgement 
with respect to the focus of the applied argument. The explanatory power provided by those 
criteria does not depend on the approximate truth of the scientific theories actually selected. 
Rather, it is based entirely on the posit of significant limitations to the underdetermination of 
theory building that is carried out in accordance with the given criteria of theory selection.  
 
5. A Different Way of Explaining Scientific Success. A picture emerges that suggests an 
altered perspective on the question of predictive success in science. While the explanatory 
power of scientific realism dwindles in more abstract, unintuitive scientific contexts, the 
question of scientific underdetermination retains its crucial position for an understanding of 
scientific success. The search for an explanation of scientific success therefore might better 
focus on an analysis of the limitations to scientific underdetermination without insisting on 
the posit of full-fledged scientific realism. The classic form of NMA then could be replaced 
accordingly by an abductive argument that involves scientific underdetermination rather than 
scientific realism. 
I suggest the following approach. The naturalness of scientific success shall be taken 
to be expressible in terms of the scientist’s options for developing scientific theories based on 
(i) the available empirical data and (ii) some reasonable general preconceptions about the 
characteristics of scientific theories. In cases where scientific theory building is vastly 
underdetermined on that basis, an endorsed scientific theory’s chances of predicting novel 
phenomena successfully are minimal. The more limited the scientist’s options are, i.e. the 
stronger limitations to scientific underdetermination arise, the better are the endorsed theory’s 
chances of novel predictive success.  
Scientific success in this picture is explained based on the two crucial assumptions of 
the validity of some general scientific preconceptions and the occurrence of limitations to 
scientific underdetermination on the basis of these preconceptions. Let us develop these 
assumptions a little more carefully. The posit of limitations to scientific underdetermination 
puts restrictions on the set of all scientific theories which are compatible with the available 
data. This posit can only be meaningful if it is based on some specific framework that defines 
which set of theories we are talking about. Such a framework may naturally be provided by 
scientific preconceptions which guide scientific theory construction. Since the posit of 
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limitations to underdetermination is supposed to explain scientific success, it must rest on 
solid objective grounds. The scientific preconceptions that provide its framework therefore 
cannot be understood merely in terms of a working prescription chosen by scientists for 
pragmatic reasons. Rather, they must be related to the world in a way that allows us to trace 
the fact of predictive success back to some characteristics of the world itself. It shall thus be 
assumed that there exists a true theory, or, to be more careful, an empirically adequate theory, 
that satisfies conditions which represent a stable core of the scientific preconceptions 
endorsed today. In this sense, today’s scientific preconceptions are taken to be partly 
empirically adequate, which represents a last vestige of the scientific realist claim that our 
present theories tell us something true about the world. The message we receive is rather 
weak, however: it amounts to the modest claim that the world can be fully described by a 
theory that fulfils a stable core of those scientific preconceptions which are adopted by 
scientists today.  
Now the claim of limitations to scientific underdetermination can be formulated. It is 
asserted that, within the framework defined by the posited set of empirically adequate 
scientific preconceptions, the underdetermination of theory building tends to be significantly 
limited in exact natural sciences. This assertion shifts the discussion to an entirely different 
level and constitutes the crucial conceptual novelty of the suggested approach: the reasons for 
scientific success are not searched for in the real world and its similarity to our present 
theories but rather in the wider realm of potentiality. Information is sought about the totality 
of all scientific schemes compatible with the presently available empirical data rather than just 
about the one true theory.  
The above analysis faces the obvious problem that we do not know the realm of 
possible theories. Any knowledge about that realm must be rooted in the claim that limitations 
to the realm of possible theories are necessary for explaining novel predictive success in 
science. An argument along these lines constitutes abductive inference of the very same kind 
the scientific realist resorts to in classical NMA: given that the assumption of limitations to 
scientific underdetermination offers the most straightforward explanation of the predictive 
success of science and given that no other approach seems to work in a satisfactory way, it is 
abductively inferred that the claim that there exist very strong limitations to scientific 
underdetermination in advanced science is indeed true.  
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